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I. INTRODUCTION
Police Investigator Anthony DeLello was called to the scene of a burglary on
May 22, 1997. He found tire tracks leading from the scene to Steve Samek’s
property. DeLello then obtained a warrant and searched Samek’s home. As the
police were preparing to leave Samek’s house at the conclusion of the search, Samek
arrived home in a van driven by his friend Douglas Jacobsen. Police arrested Samek
when several of the items stolen in the burglary were found in the back of the van.
Jacobsen was not arrested and later implicated Samek in the burglary. Two days
later, Samek’s wife gave police an audiotape (the “Tape”) of a male voice confessing
to the burglary. Based upon the contents of the Tape, DeLello formed the belief that
the person speaking on the Tape was Jacobsen. DeLello then gave the Tape to
prosecutor Edward Barce. DeLello told Barce his belief that the speaker was
Jacobsen and played the Tape for Barce. Barce then instructed DeLello not to place
the Tape into evidence. Barce did not tell DeLello to destroy the Tape. Neither
Barce nor DeLello can remember whether DeLello took the Tape with him or left it
with Barce. The Tape was never found after this meeting. Jacobsen cannot be
located and is assumed to have fled.2
Samek filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him claiming that the State’s
failure to preserve exculpatory evidence in the form of the Tape violated his
constitutional right to due process.3 Samek’s due process claim is governed by two
Supreme Court cases, California v. Trombetta4 and Arizona v. Youngblood,5 which
“set out the test . . . to determine when the government’s failure to preserve evidence
rises to the level of a due process violation.”6

2
These facts are based upon Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. App. 1997), reh’g
denied (Feb. 19, 1998).
3
U.S. CONST. amend V. (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV, 1 (“[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . . .”).
4

467 U.S. 479 (1984) [hereinafter Trombetta].

5

488 U.S. 51 (1988) [hereinafter Youngblood].

6

United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Cooper].

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss2/6

2

2000]

HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW

337

Cases like defendant Samek’s, which require due process analysis of the
government’s failure to preserve evidence, routinely arise.7 It is well settled that
Trombetta and Youngblood govern analysis of these cases.8 Despite this agreement,
7
For example, some of the cases requiring Trombetta and Youngblood analysis that arose
during 1998 include: United States v. Wilson, No. 97-1298, 1998 WL 538119 (2d Cir. Mar.
13, 1998); United States v. Sofidiya, No. 97-4681, 1998 WL 743597 (4th Cir. Oct. 23, 1998);
Little v. Johnson, No. 98-40240, 1998 WL 853027 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 1998); Irby v. DeTella,
No. 97-1797, 1998 WL 796064 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 1998); United States v. Garcia, No. 9750576, 1998 WL 568052 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 1998); United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762,
1998 WL 214666 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 1998); Otsuki v. Dubois, 994 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass. Feb.
5, 1998); State v. Gaston, No. L-97-1170, 1998 WL 833556 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1998);
State v. Leggett, No. WM-97-029, 1998 WL 614553 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 4, 1998); People v.
Frye, 18 Cal. 4th 894 (Cal. 1998); Robinson v. State, No. 04-97-00392-CR, 1998 WL 236324
(Tex. Ct. App. May 13, 1998); State v. Hawkins, 958 P.2d 22 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998); Hawkins
v. State, 964 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1998).
8

Trombetta and Youngblood govern all due process claims that arise under the federal
constitution. See generally Cooper, 983 F.2d at 931. A majority of state courts also apply
Trombetta and Youngblood to due process claims arising under their state constitutions (or
they do not differentiate between the standards that apply to state and federal claims and apply
Trombetta and Youngblood to both). See State v. Walden, 905 P.2d 974 (Ariz. 1995); Wenzel
v. State, 815 S.W.2d 938 (Ark. 1991); State v. Walker, 914 P.2d 1320 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995);
People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 166 (Cal. 1995), overruled in part by Calderon v. United
States, 163 F.3d 530 (1998) and EgoAguirre v. White, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3162 (1999);
People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Bock, 659 So. 2d 1196 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walker v. State, 449 S.E.2d 845 (Ga. 1994); Stuart v. State, 907 P.2d
783 (Idaho 1995); People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1997); Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d
928 (Ind. 1994); Taylor v. State, 834 P.2d 1325 (Kan. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by
State v. Rice, 932 P.2d 981 (Kan. 1997); Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569 (Ky.
1997); State v. Schexnayder, 685 So. 2d 357 (La. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Berkley, 567 A.2d
915 (Me. 1989); People v. Huttenga, 493 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Holland v.
State, 587 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1991); State v. Richard, 798 S.W.2d 468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Peterson, 494 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1993); People v. Scattareggia, 152 A.D.2d 679 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); State v. Robinson, 488 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1997); State v. Estep, 598 N.E.2d
96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Torres v. State, 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998); State v.
Hendershott, 887 P.2d 351 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Moss, 689 A.2d 259 (Pa.
1997); State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180 (R.I. 1994); State v. Jackson, 396 S.E.2d 101 (S.C.
1990); State v. Arguello, 502 N.W.2d 548 (S.D. 1993); State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Rudd, 871 S.W.2d 530 (Tx. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Holden, 964 P.2d 318 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Mullins v. Commonwealth, No. 1250-94-3, 1996
WL 343953 (Va. Ct. App. June 25, 1996); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996);
State v. Greenwold, 525 N.W.2d 294 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570 (Wyo.
1990).
A minority of states have either rejected the Trombetta/Youngblood approach because of
concerns that the bad faith requirement doesn=t adequately guarantee due process, see infra
note 70, and apply a balancing test approach to analysis of due process claims arising under
their state constitutions, or, apply Trombetta and Youngblood along with additional criteria or
factors. See ex parte Gingo, 605 So. 2d 1237 (Ala. 1992); Thorne v. Department of Public
Safety, 774 P.3d 1326, 1330 n.9 (Alaska 1989); State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1995);
Brown v. United States, 1998 WL 422676 (D.C. 1998); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81 (Del.
1989); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671 (Haw. 1990); State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa
1992); State v. Schmid, 487 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 582 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1991); State v. Halter, 777 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1989);
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however, courts frequently botch their application of Trombetta and Youngblood.
Hoping to prevent future blunders, this Article identifies three mistakes that courts
commonly make when applying Trombetta and Youngblood and seeks to clarify
Trombetta and Youngblood’s proper application. As preparation for the discussion,
this Article introduces the Trombetta and Youngblood cases. Trombetta and
Youngblood are then applied to defendant Samek’s situation in an attempt to discern
whether he has a sound due process claim. The uncertainties that arise in this
application justify examination of three specific questions. Part I of this Article
examines the first question, what does it mean for evidence to have “apparent
exculpatory value?” Part II of this Article answers the second question, when does
Youngblood’s bad faith requirement apply in failure to preserve evidence cases? Part
III then seeks to determine the substance of Youngblood’s bad faith requirement and
identify the best approach to defining it. Ultimately, this Article argues that there are
three common mistakes that courts make when applying Trombetta and Youngblood.
These mistakes are made because the answers to the three questions explored in Parts
I through III are confused, ignored, or unclear. To avoid making these mistakes in
the future, courts applying Trombetta and Youngblood must first correctly examine
evidence to determine whether it has “apparent exculpatory value,” focusing on
whether any exculpatory value was apparent and recognizing that evidence does not
need to exonerate a defendant to meet this standard. Second, courts must apply
Youngblood’s bad faith requirement to all failure to preserve evidence cases.
Finally, courts must adopt the rebuttable presumption approach as the best method
for defining bad faith.
II. CALIFORNIA V. TROMBETTA
When stopped on suspicion of drunken driving on California highways,
Trombetta submitted to an Intoxilyzer9 test which revealed a blood alcohol
concentration higher than the legal limit in California. Accordingly, Trombetta was
charged with driving while intoxicated. Prior to Trial, Trombetta filed a motion to
suppress the results of the Intoxilyzer test on the grounds that the police had failed to
preserve the breath samples. Trombetta claimed that “had a breath sample been
preserved, he would have been able to impeach the incriminating Intoxilyzer
results.”10
Rejecting Trombetta’s motion, the Court found that a State only has a duty to
preserve evidence that is constitutionally material. “To meet this standard of
constitutional materiality, . . . evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that
was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
Keener v. State, 850 P.3d 311 (Nev. 1993); State v. Smagula, 578 A.2d 1215 (N.H. 1990);
State v. Dreher, 695 A.2d 672 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); State v. Barnett, 543 N.W.2d
774 (N.D. 1996); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632 (Vt. 1994); State v. Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d
504 (W. Va. 1995). Finally, I was unable to locate any Maryland cases that consider this issue
post-Youngblood.
9
“The Omicron Intoxilyzer . . . is a device used in California to measure the concentration
of alcohol in the blood of motorists suspected of driving while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481.
10

Id. at 483.
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available means.”11 The Intoxilyzer evidence failed both prongs of the materiality
test. It did not possess exculpatory value; “the chances [were] extremely low that
preserved samples would have been exculpatory,”12 and “were much more likely to
provide inculpatory . . . evidence.”13 Trombetta also had “alternative means of
demonstrating [his] innocence.”14
The Court’s articulation of the constitutional materiality test was preceded by a
discussion of specific facts present in Trombetta which contributed to its
determination that “the State’s failure to retain breath samples . . . [does not
constitute] a violation of the Federal Constitution.”15 First, “California authorities in
this case did not destroy [the] breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the
disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland and its progeny.”16
Second, “the officers . . . were acting ‘in good faith and in accord with their normal
practice.’”17 Third, there was no allegation of “official animus towards [Trombetta]
or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”18 Finally, “California’s
policy of not preserving breath samples [was] without constitutional defect.”19
III. ARIZONA V. YOUNGBLOOD
A young boy was kidnapped, molested and sexually assaulted. The hospital
which treated the boy following the ordeal used a “sexual assault kit” to collect
evidence of the attack. The evidence was then turned over to the police who placed
the kit in a secure refrigerator. The police also collected the boy’s underwear and Tshirt but these items were not refrigerated. The police criminologist found semen

11

Id. at 489.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 490. Trombetta could have challenged the reliability of the
Intoxilyzer machine or cross-examined the police officer who administered the Intoxilyzer
test. Id.
15

Id. at 488.

16

Id; see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) [hereinafter Brady], held that upon
the request of a criminal defendant, the State has a duty to disclose evidence material to guilt
or punishment. If the State does not do this, due process is violated . . . .” The extent of the
Brady guarantee was subsequently expanded by United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976),
which held that the State has an absolute duty to disclose to criminal defendants evidence
material to their guilt or innocence even in the absence of a specific request.
17

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488 (citing Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (1961)). In
Killian v. United States, the Court held that destruction of a police officer’s preliminary notes
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. “If the agents’ notes . . . were made only
for the purpose of transferring the data thereon . . . , and if, having served that purpose, they
were destroyed by the agents in good faith and in accord with their normal practices, it would
be clear that their destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence . . . .”
Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
18

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.

19

Id.
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stains on the underwear and T-shirt but was unable to successfully test them because
the stains had not been properly preserved.
Larry Youngblood was convicted by a jury of the kidnapping, child molestation
and sexual assault. His principal defense was that the boy (victim) misidentified him
as the perpetrator. Apparently, Youngblood claimed that had the semen stains on the
boy’s clothing been properly preserved, test results might have completely
exonerated him. Rejecting this argument, the Court, after discussing Trombetta,20
found that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police,
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process of law.”21 While bad faith is not a consideration when the State fails to
disclose material exculpatory evidence, “the Due Process Clause requires a different
result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of
which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results
of which might have exonerated the defendant.”22
The purpose of the bad faith requirement is to “limit[] the extent of the police’s
obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confine[] it to that class of
cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which
the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis
for exonerating the defendant.” The Court did not explicitly define bad faith. Other
than the purpose statement above, their main indication of the substance of bad faith
comes in a footnote. “The presence or absence of bad faith by the police for
purposes of the Due Process Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge
of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”23
Like the Court in Trombetta, the Court in Youngblood articulated specific facts
which contributed to its holding. First, “[t]he failure of the police to refrigerate the
clothing and to perform tests on the semen samples can at worst be described as
negligent.”24 Second, the police’s failure to refrigerate the sample and the sample’s
subsequent resistance to testing was not concealed from Youngblood. Finally, the
Court relied on a lower court’s note that factually, “there was no suggestion of bad
faith on the part of the police.”25 Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion in Youngblood
also identified as critical the fact that “at the time the police failed to refrigerate the
victim’s clothing . . . they had at least as great an interest in preserving the evidence
as did the person later accused of the crime.”26
20

The Youngblood Court described the holding in Trombetta as based on three premises.
First, that the officers were acting “in good faith and in accord with their normal practice;”
second, that the chances that the preserved samples would have exculpated the defendants
were slim, and third, that the defendants had “alternative means of demonstrating their
innocence.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56.
21

Id. at 58.

22

Id. at 57.

23

Id. at 56 n.*.

24

Id. at 58.

25

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51.

26

Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens identified two other factors which,
post-trial, are helpful to analysis of a Youngblood claim. First, Justice Stevens found it
“unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the State’s omission.” Id. This was because
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IV. APPLICATION OF TROMBETTA
Applying Trombetta’s constitutional materiality test to Samek, the critical inquiry
is into the exculpatory value of the lost Tape. There are two tenable responses to this
inquiry. On one hand, it seems clear that the lost Tape had apparent exculpatory
value. Both DeLello and Barce had the opportunity to hear the Tape prior to its loss.
They were aware that the Tape contained a confession to the burglary for which
Samek had been arrested. They believed that the confessor was Jacobsen. If
Jacobsen committed the burglary, this would tend to clear Samek from fault. On the
other hand, it is possible to conclude that the Tape was not exculpatory evidence, but
rather, was merely “potentially useful evidence.”27 The mere fact that a person other
than Samek confessed to the burglary does not necessarily tend to clear him from
guilt. First, the confessor merely said that he, himself, committed the burglary. The
confessor did not say that Samek did not commit the burglary.28 This is particularly
significant given the possibility that Samek and Jacobsen committed the crime
together; they were together when the police arrested Samek and they were both in
the van carrying the burgled items. Second, the confessor on the Tape did not
identify himself.29 Though DeLello believed that the confessor was Jacobsen, this
belief was mere speculation at the time the Tape was lost. Next, the circumstances
surrounding the making of the Tape were unknown.30 Samek’s wife delivered the
Tape. She did not explain how or why she was in possession of the Tape. She made
no statement as to her belief in the authenticity of the Tape. At the time of its loss,
DeLello’s belief in the Tape’s authenticity was not grounded in objective fact.31
Unfortunately, the Court in Trombetta offers little guidance as to the definition of
“exculpatory” as used in its rule or the distinction (if any32) between exculpatory and
potentially exculpatory evidence. As a result, it is necessary to address the issue of
what constitutes exculpatory evidence under Trombetta.
the trial court instructed the jury: “If you find that the State has . . . allowed to be destroyed or
lost any evidence whose content or quality are in issue, you may infer that the true fact is
against the State’s interest.” Id. Second, Stevens concluded that “the fact that no juror chose
to draw the permissive inference that proper preservation of the evidence would have
demonstrated that the defendant was not the assailant suggest(s) that the lost evidence was
immaterial. Id. at 60. These two factors are not helpful to a pre-trial analysis of a Youngblood
claim.
27

This was the conclusion of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d
1286, 1289 (Ind. Appeals 1997). See infra note 52 for further discussion.
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

This Article proceeds on the assumption that the Tape would be admissible at trial. It is
important to note, however, that there is a potential hearsay problem with the Tape. See
Indiana Rules of Evidence, Article VIII. Hearsay; see also Samek, 688 N.E.2d at 1287 (noting
that the trial court granted a motion stating that the Tape was inadmissible hearsay).
32

In many instances it is unclear whether courts use and/or quote “potentially exculpatory
evidence” in an effort to distinguish it from the sort of exculpatory value required by
Trombetta or whether it is a term is sufficient to satisfy Trombetta’s materiality requirement.
See infra Part I.
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V. APPLICATION OF YOUNGBLOOD
Seeking to determine whether Samek represents one of those cases where “the
police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant,”33 the critical inquiry is whether DeLello and/or Barce
acted in bad faith in failing to preserve the lost Tape. There are several tenable
responses to this inquiry.
Youngblood emphasizes the connection between the presence of bad faith and
“the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was
lost or destroyed.”34 Apparently, if police know that evidence has exculpatory value
and that evidence is subsequently lost then this is prima facie evidence35 of bad faith.
One response to the bad faith inquiry then, is that because Barce and DeLello knew
that the Tape had either exculpatory value or at least potential exculpatory value36
prior to the loss of the Tape, Youngblood requires a conclusive finding that bad faith
was present.37 Another response is that Barce and DeLello’s loss of evidence which
they knew had exculpatory value creates a rebuttable presumption that they acted in
bad faith.38 A final response is that bad faith is simply not present;39 Samek offered
no independent facts or evidence sufficient to allow the Court to find that Barce or
DeLello acted in bad faith.
The factors discussed by the Youngblood majority are not particularly helpful to
an assessment of which of the above responses is most consistent with the Court’s
intent. A main reason for this is the fact that, at the time of loss, both DeLello and
Barce had listened to the Tape and knew that it contained a confession to the
burglary and had reason to think that the confessor was not the defendant. By
contrast, the police in Youngblood did not know that there were semen stains on the
boy’s underwear or T-Shirt when they collected them and they further did not know
the significance of those stains (i.e. whether, once tested, they would tend to
inculpate or exculpate defendant). Barce and DeLello’s awareness of the content and
potential value of the Tape magnifies the significance of footnote * and its
conclusion that “the presence . . . of bad faith . . . must necessarily turn on the
police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence.”
Looking specifically at the factors that the Youngblood Court considered, Barce
and DeLello’s awareness of the value of the Tape further makes a conclusion that its
loss was the result of “mere negligence” more difficult than was the same
determination in Youngblood. This awareness also precludes a finding that at the
time the Tape was lost the police “had at least as great an interest in preserving the
33

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

34

Id. at 56 n.*.

35

Prima facie evidence is “[e]vidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence . . . is
sufficient to establish a given fact, . . . which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990).
36

See infra Part I applying Trombetta to Samek and discussing whether the lost Tape had
exculpatory value or potential exculpatory value.
37

See infra Part III.A.

38

See infra Part III.B.

39

See infra Part III.C.
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evidence” as did Samek. Barce and DeLello presumably had sufficient evidence to
support, at minimum, Samek’s arrest for the burglary. If the Tape had turned out to
be insignificant (i.e. it was later determined to be a fabrication or to have no
evidentiary value) their case would be in the same position as it was before the Tape
appeared. On the other hand, if the Tape were admitted into evidence at trial, it
could significantly weaken their case.
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES APPARENT EXCULPATORY VALUE?
Exculpatory evidence “tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from
alleged fault or guilt.”40 Therefore, any evidence that “tends to justify, excuse or
clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt” has exculpatory value. Exculpatory
value is apparent when this value is “obvious, evident, or manifest.”41 Though these
definitions may appear straightforward,42 courts mistakenly apply the concept of
“apparent exculpatory value” on a regular basis. Many of these mistakes stem from
an undefined distinction between evidence with “apparent exculpatory value” and
evidence with “potential exculpatory value.”43 This unclear distinction is further
confused by the fact that courts each seem to define “apparent exculpatory value”
and “potential exculpatory value” differently. By in large, courts have failed to
clarify their use of these terms. As a result, different courts dealing with the same
piece of evidence apply different labels to it and arrive at different conclusions as to
whether it satisfies Trombetta’s “apparent exculpatory value” requirement. To
resolve the confusion, I rely on the black letter definitions provided above and then
look to various discussions and determinations of “apparent exculpatory value.”
A. Evidence Which Has Been Tested and Appears to be Inculpatory
Evidence which has been examined or tested by government agents and appears
to be inculpatory evidence does not have apparent exculpatory value.44 Such
evidence is “not expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense” as “the
chances are extremely low that [the] preserved [evidence] would have been
exculpatory.”45
The breath samples in Trombetta provide an example of evidence that has been
tested and appears to have only inculpatory value. The Intoxilyzer twice analyzed
samples of Trombetta’s breath. Trombetta registered a blood-alcohol concentration
higher than the legal limit. Given the reading of the Intoxilyzer there was nothing
that would have suggested to the police officer who performed the tests that the

40

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990).

41

Id. at 96.

42

The Trombetta and Youngblood courts seem to have understood what they meant when
they used these term “apparent exculpatory value.” Had they been confused or anticipated
that the term would cause confusion, it seems likely that they would have provided some
explicit definition beyond the standard and commonly used definition.
43

See infra Part I.E.

44

See generally Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489-90.

45

Id. at 489.
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breath samples might in any way exculpate Trombetta. The breath samples therefore
did not have apparent exculpatory value.
The breath samples in Trombetta were tested and appeared inculpatory. By
contrast, the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello was examined and was not inculpatory.
Instead, it appeared to be exculpatory in nature. As a result, the reasoning applied to
the destroyed breath samples in Trombetta does not apply to the lost Tape in Samek.
B. Evidence Which Could Have Been Subjected to Tests Which Might Have
Exonerated Defendant
Evidence that has not been examined or tested by government agents provides a
prime example of evidence that does not have apparent exculpatory value.46
“Trombetta speaks of evidence whose exculpatory value is ‘apparent.’ . . . . The
possibility that . . . samples could have exculpated [defendant] if preserved or tested
is not enough to satisfy the standard.”47
The stains on the boy’s clothing in Youngblood are an example of the sort of
evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.”48 Because the
stains were not tested prior to their degradation, there was no way of knowing
whether the stains tended to implicate or exculpate defendant Youngblood.49
The lost Tape in Samek is not like the lost stains in Youngblood. While
government agents in Youngblood had no awareness at all of any sort of exculpatory
value in stains on the boy’s clothing, Barce and DeLello knew the contents of the
Tape and were fully aware that it had value to Samek.
C. Evidence Whose Possible Exculpatory Value is Apparent Prior to its Loss or
Destruction
Evidence whose exculpatory value is suggested to or recognized by government
agents may qualify under Trombetta as having apparent exculpatory value. In
United States v. Cooper50 government agents seized laboratory equipment from
Cooper, a suspected methamphetamine manufacturer. Cooper immediately told
government agents that the equipment was used in his legitimate chemical
manufacturing business and was neither capable of nor configured to produce
methamphetamine. Government agents knew that Cooper did have a legitimate
chemical manufacturing business. Independent experts later testified that were the
equipment configured as Cooper said, it would not have been capable of producing
methamphetamine. Before the equipment was examined it was destroyed as part of
routine procedure. The Court concluded that the equipment’s exculpatory value was

46

See generally Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51.

47

Id. at 56 n.*.

48

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.

49

Id. at 54-55.

50

983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993). It is useful to note that Cooper is one of the few (if not the
only) published case where the court successfully concluded that the lost evidence had
exculpatory value. Interestingly, this conclusion came after the government failed to
challenge the district court’s same determination about the value of the evidence.
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apparent before destruction.51 Following Cooper, evidence need not be “certain” to
exonerate a defendant to qualify as having “exculpatory value” under Trombetta.
This conclusion is affirmed by the Court’s explicit reference to the destroyed lab
equipment’s value as “potentially exculpatory evidence.”52
The facts in Samek are somewhat similar to those in Cooper. In the same way
that the government agents in Cooper knew about the value of the equipment to
Cooper, it is clear that Barce and DeLello, having heard the burglary confession on
the Tape, knew of its value to Samek. Though it is not certain that the Tape would
have exonerated Samek–the facts may have born out that Samek and Jacobsen
committed the crime together–there is little argument that the Tape would have
tended to cast some doubt on Samek’s guilt. As a result, the Tape had apparent
exculpatory value.53
D. Evidence that will Certainly Exonerate a Defendant
Evidence that will certainly exonerate a defendant necessarily qualifies as having
exculpatory value. It is this sort of evidence that most clearly satisfies Trombetta’s
requirement. There are, however, no discoverable cases where the exculpatory value
of lost or destroyed evidence has been this clear.54 Ultimately, it must be admitted
that once evidence is lost, its exculpatory value can rarely, if ever, be conclusively

51

Id. at 931.

52

Id.

53

Despite my conclusion that the Tape does have exculpatory value, I would be remiss if I
did not note that the Indiana Court of Appeals held otherwise in Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d
1286, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). As explained in my analysis, I disagree with their
conclusion. One of the few cases that contains an investigation of the meaning of “exculpatory
value,” the Court in Samek first looked to Black’s Law dictionary defining evidence with
exculpatory value as evidence that “tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant from alleged
fault or guilt.” Supra note 39. Working from this definition, I find it difficult to believe that
an objective court would conclude that a taped confession of a man other than the defendant
would not “tend to clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt.” If evidence like the lost
Tape does not meet this requirement, I find it difficult to imagine lost or destroyed evidence
that would ever meet this requirement.
After defining exculpatory value, the Court then distinguished an Indiana Supreme Court
case, Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994) (holding that a tape recording of a
defendant’s preliminary advisements was material evidence where the tape would have
supported defendant’s assertion that he was under duress at the time he gave his statement),
which ostensibly would have required a finding that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello was
of “apparent exculpatory value.” The Court reasoned “We think that . . . the [Supreme Court
in Bivins] was using ‘material’ in the traditional sense rather than as a term of art as employed
by the Court in Youngblood.” Id. at 1288. They proceeded to announce a distinction between
“potentially useful evidence” and “materially exculpatory evidence” without fleshing out the
distinction. With no analysis other than that recounted infra at Part VII.B. (discussion of
Trombetta application to Samek), the Court concluded that the lost Tape fell into the category
of “potentially useful evidence” and did not satisfy Trombetta’s “apparent exculpatory value”
requirement. Id. at 1289.
54

I have found no reported cases in which the exculpatory value of evidence was this clear.
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established.55 As a result, it is a rare, if non-existent, situation where lost or
destroyed evidence is deemed clearly exculpatory by a fact finding court.
E. Framework for Understanding “Exculpatory Value”
The key to a proper understanding of exculpatory value is not so much the
distinctions between different levels of exculpatory value (i.e. potential v. certain),
but the requirement that such value be “apparent” prior to loss or destruction of the
evidence.56 The mere failure to preserve evidence which could have been subjected
to tests which might have exonerated the defendant will not constitute a due process
violation because the evidence had no exculpatory value that was apparent before its
loss. In the same way, there is no apparent exculpatory value to evidence that has
been tested and is apparently inculpatory. However, when the government fails to
preserve evidence that has apparent potential to “cast doubt on the guilt of
defendant,” such evidence has exculpatory value within the meaning of Trombetta.
So long as its exculpatory value is apparent, this qualification as having exculpatory
value applies regardless of the degree with which it is certain that the evidence will
exculpate a defendant (i.e. certain or potential).
VII. WHEN DOES YOUNGBLOOD’S BAD FAITH REQUIREMENT APPLY TO FAILURE TO
PRESERVE EVIDENCE CASES?
Having concluded that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello satisfies Trombetta’s
exculpatory value requirement, it is necessary to determine whether satisfaction of
Trombetta’s materiality test57 alone constitutes a violation of Samek’s right to due
process or whether Samek must also prove bad faith under Youngblood to show a
due process violation. There are two tenable responses to this inquiry.
A. Approach #1 Bad Faith is a Required Element of All Failure to Preserve
Evidence Claims
One response is that Samek must prove the presence of bad faith under
Youngblood. The First Circuit in United States v. Femia58 explained” [i]n
Youngblood, the Court . . . added a third element” to Trombetta’s two pronged
materiality test. Following Youngblood,
[any] defendant who seeks to suppress evidence formerly in the
government’s possession therefore must show that the government, in
failing to preserve the evidence, (1) acted in bad faith when it destroyed
evidence, which (2) possessed an apparent exculpatory value and, which
(3) is to some extent irreplaceable. Thus in missing evidence cases, the

55

See State v. Okumura, 894 P.2d 80, 99 (Haw. 1995).

56

Youngblood “reemphasized Trombetta’s focus on whether the exculpatory value of the
evidence was apparent before its destruction.” State v. Leroux, 557 A.2d 1271, 1273 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1989) (emphasis added).
57

This Article proceeds on the assumption that the evidence lost by Barce and DeLello is
unobtainable from other sources.
58

9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993).
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presence or absence of good or bad faith by the government will be
dispositive.59
There are two major implications of this approach. First, as noted by Femia,
good or bad faith becomes relevant, if not dispositive, to the analysis of each and
every case where the government fails to preserve evidence that has apparent
exculpatory value. Second, any determination that evidence lacks apparent
exculpatory value60 becomes dispositive.61 Whenever the government fails to
preserve evidence that has no apparent exculpatory value, the good or bad faith of
police is not a consideration.
B. Approach #2 Bad Faith is Only Required When Evidence is Not Material Under
Trombetta
A different response is that Samek is not required to prove bad faith because the
lost Tape had apparent exculpatory value. Bad faith is only required when
government agents fail to preserve evidence whose exculpatory value is
indeterminate. The Tenth Circuit demonstrated this approach in United States v.
Bohl.62
We first must determine whether Trombetta or Youngblood governs our
analysis of [the defendants’] due process challenge. This inquiry turns on

59
Id. at 993-94. See, e.g., United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 833 (2d Cir. 1989); Jones
v. McCaughtry, 965 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458,
463 (8th Cir. 1990); People v. Muna, 1992 WL 245624, *3 (D. Guam App. Div. 1992);
Maravilla v. United States, 901 F. Supp. 62, 68 (D.P.R. 1995).
60

See infra Part I.

61
This stands in contrast to Approach #2 which allows for the possibility that the failure to
preserve evidence without apparent exculpatory value might rise to the level of a due process
violation if bad faith is present. See supra discussion of Approach #2.
62
25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th
Cir. 1996). It is necessary to note that while Bohl correctly articulated this approach, it did not
correctly apply the approach. In Bohl, government agents failed to preserve steel tower legs
whose chemical composition was central to the case against defendants Bell and Bohl. The
tower legs were destroyed after the government was explicitly and repeatedly placed on notice
that Bell and Bohl wanted the legs preserved and believed they were exculpatory, and after the
government was presented with objective, independent evidence which gave them reason to
believe that further tests on the tower legs might lead to exculpatory evidence. Bohl, 25 F.3d
at 911. The exculpatory value of the tower legs was apparent before their destruction. More
could be said than that “[the evidence] could have been subjected to tests the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.” Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. As a result, the tower
legs should have been recognized as having “apparent exculpatory value,” see infra Part VI
(discussion of this value), and bad faith should not have been required to prove a due process
violation.
The Court in Bohl recognized the factual similarities between their case and United States
v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1993), (this recognition came during the discussion of bad
faith), yet failed to follow Cooper’s analysis, see infra Part I.C., which would have lead to the
conclusion that the tower legs did have apparent exculpatory value. Following the approach
they articulate, had the Bohl Court reached this conclusion, they would have found a due
process violation without requiring a finding of bad faith.
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the import of the destroyed materials. To invoke Trombetta, a defendant
must demonstrate that the government destroyed evidence possessing an
‘apparent’ exculpatory value. However, to trigger the Youngblood test, all
that need be shown is that the government destroyed “potentially useful
evidence.”
The Court in Youngblood defined “potentially useful
evidence” as evidence of which “no more can be said than that it could
have been subjected to tests the results of which might have exonerated
the defendant.” Because our review of the record concludes that the [lost
evidence] offered only potentially useful evidence for [defendants’]
defense, we apply the rule of Youngblood rather than Trombetta.63
Applying Bohl’s approach to Samek, because the Tape had apparent exculpatory
value64 Youngblood is not triggered and bad faith is not relevant to a determination of
whether Samek’s due process rights were violated.
There are two major implications of this approach. First, a due process violation
may be shown even where the police acted in good faith so long as the evidence has
apparent exculpatory value. Second, a due process violation may be shown even
where the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent at the time the
evidence was lost or destroyed.
C. Approach #1 Correctly Applies Trombetta and Youngblood
The implications of Approach #2 are not consistent with Trombetta and
Youngblood. First, it is not correct that a due process violation may be shown even
where the police acted in good faith. Trombetta itself indicated that good faith was a
separate and distinct reason for finding no due process violation. Moreover,
Youngblood read Trombetta this way. If a due process violation cannot occur when
government agents act in good faith, then bad faith must necessarily be a part of any
due process violation. Consequently, Approach #1’s inclusion of Youngblood’s bad
faith requirement in every assessment of a failure to preserve evidence case is
proper. Second, and also weighing against Approach #2, a due process violation
may not be shown where the exculpatory value of the evidence was not apparent at
the time it was lost or destroyed. Youngblood indicated that its bad faith requirement
extended, rather than replaced, Trombetta’s requirement that the evidence have
apparent exculpatory value. Youngblood explained, “we made clear in Trombetta
that the exculpatory value of the evidence must be apparent ‘before the evidence [is]
destroyed.’“ By contrast, Youngblood was not able to show “that the police knew the
semen samples would have exculpated him when they failed to [preserve it].”65
Moreover, Youngblood declared, “The presence or absence of bad faith . . . must
necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence
at the time it was lost or destroyed,” and justified the bad faith requirement on the
ground that it “limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence . . . to
those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the
evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”66 Police conduct would
63

United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d at 910 (citations omitted).

64

See infra Part I.C.

65

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.* (citations omitted).

66

Id. at 56 n.* & 58.
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not indicate an awareness that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant if they themselves were not aware that the evidence had apparent
exculpatory value.
Approach #1 does not forget Trombetta’s materiality
requirement, but combines it with the bad faith requirement. This is workable and
consistent with both Trombetta and Youngblood.
Approach #1 correctly applies Trombetta and Youngblood. Accordingly, to
prove a due process violation, Samek must show that Barce and DeLello acted in bad
faith when they lost the Tape.
VIII. WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF BAD FAITH?67
To prove a due process violation, Samek must prove that Barce and DeLello
acted in bad faith. However, to properly assess evidence offered to prove the
presence of bad faith a court must first determine what is necessary to establish bad
faith. Though the question, “What constitutes bad faith . . . ?”68 was first posed over
a decade ago by Justice Blackmun in his Youngblood dissent, there is still no clear
answer to the question.69
One reason such an answer has not been reached is that discussion of the
substance of the bad faith requirement has been overshadowed by concern over
whether Youngblood adequately preserves a defendant’s constitutional right to due
process. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion to Youngblood, recognized,
“there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State
acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so
critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial unfair.”70 Justice Steven’s due
process concern gave rise to a lengthy dialogue among legal scholars, the majority of
whom conclude that Youngblood’s bad faith requirement falls short of guaranteeing
due process to criminal defendants.71
67

All of the discussion in Part III is predicated on the assumption that the elements of
Trombetta’s two prong materiality test, that the evidence have apparent exculpatory value and
be unobtainable from other sources, have already been proven.
68

Id. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I also doubt that the ‘bad faith’ standard creates the
bright-line rule sought by the majority. . . . the line between ‘good faith’ and ‘bad faith’ is
anything but bright, and the majority’s formulation may well create more questions than it
answers. What constitutes bad faith for these purposes?”).
69

Currently, courts continue to struggle with the definition of bad faith. In June 1998 the
Court in Rodriguez v. State, No. 03-97-00180-CR, 1998 WL 303873, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.
June 11, 1998), reaffirmed that “[w]hat constitutes “bad faith” is not altogether clear from the
case law.”
70

Id. at 61 (Stevens, J., concurring).

71

See generally Sarah M. Bernstein, Note, Fourteenth Amendment-Police Failure to
Preserve Evidence and Erosion of the Due Process Right to a Fair Trial, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1256 (1990); Albert M. T. Finch, III, Note, “Oops! We Forgot to Put it in the
Refrigerator”: DNA Identification and the State’s Duty to Preserve Evidence, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 809 (1992); B. W. Gordon, Jr., Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Failure of
Police to Preserve Evidence Held Not to Be a Denial of Due Process of Law Absent
Defendant’s Showing Bad Faith on Part of Police: Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333
(1988), 20 CUMB. L. REV. 211 (1989); Linda Gensler Kaufmann, Arizona v. Youngblood, State
Advantage in Criminal Proceedings: the Ghost Is Real and the Haunting Continues, 14 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 665 (1989); Matthew H. Lembke, Note, The Role of Police Culpability in

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000

15

350

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:335

While the due process problem identified by Justice Stevens is important, the
substance of the bad faith requirement is a more immediate concern. Despite the
criticism of courts and academics, a majority of the Supreme Court in Youngblood
necessarily found that the bad faith requirement affords criminal defendants due
process. More importantly, in the decade following Youngblood, the Court has
offered no indication that it plans to reconsider or alter the bad faith requirement.
Admitting that the requirement is here to stay, an understanding of its substance is
crucial to its proper application. This Article, therefore, focuses on the substance of
the bad faith requirement, assuming that at a base level, the requirement does provide
due process.
Another reason there has been no answer to the question “what constitutes bad
faith?” is that the majority of Trombetta/Youngblood cases involve evidence which
had no apparent exculpatory value.72 Once this determination is reached, the
presence or absence of bad faith becomes moot, because without apparent
exculpatory value there can be no due process violation.73 Moreover, those courts
that try to explore bad faith are fundamentally handicapped in their attempts because
bad faith and exculpatory value are so intertwined;74 when there is no exculpatory
value bad faith cannot be fully explored. Next, there is no clear definition of bad
faith because those courts who have had occasion to consider the requirement have
adopted different approaches to its application.75 Finally, there are a very limited
number of cases where courts have found the presence of bad faith.76 As a result,
there is little opportunity to observe the affirmative character of bad faith.
Leon and Youngblood, 76 VA. L. REV. 1213 (1990); Willis C. Moore, Note, Arizona v.
Youngblood: Does the Criminal Defendant Lose His Right to Due Process When the State
Loses Exculpatory Evidence?, 5 TOURO L. REV. 309 (1989, 90); Karen Carlson Paul, Note,
Destruction of Exculpatory Evidence: Bad Faith Standard Erodes Due Process Rights,
Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988), 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1181 (1989); Trish Peyser
Perlmutter, Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), 24 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 529
(1989). But see Gavin Frost, Arizona v. Youngblood Adherence to a Bad Faith Threshold
Test Before Recognizing a Deprivation of Due Process, 34 S.D. L. REV. 303 at 407 (1989)
(praising Youngblood as effectively securing due process for criminal defendants).
72
See generally, People v. Hines, 938 P.2d 388, 419-20 (Cal. 1997); People v. Beeler, 891
P.2d 153, 165-67 (Cal. 1995); People v. Freeman, 8 Cal. 4th 450, 456 (1994); People v.
Hardy, 825 P.2d 781, 827 (Cal. 1992); People v. Zapien, 846 P.2d 704, 722-23 (Cal. 1993).
73

See supra Part II.C. for discussion of apparent exculpatory value.

74

See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.* (“The presence or absence of bad faith . . . must
necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence . . . .”).
75

See supra Part III.A - C.

76

I have found only three post-Youngblood cases where bad faith was present. See United
States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding bad faith because the government
“[left] unchallenged the district court’s conclusion that the police acted in bad faith by
allowing the [evidence] to be destroyed while assuring [the defendant] and his attorney that it
was being held as evidence”); United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 911-13 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding bad faith because the facts and evidence in the case, “in the absence of any innocent
explanation offered by the government, [gave] rise to a logical conclusion of bad faith”);
Stuart v. State, 907 P.3d 783, 793 (Idaho 1995) (“We believe that the failure to provide
discovery regarding the taped phone call is a sufficiently proximate cause of the destruction of
the phone log evidence so as to rise to the level of bad faith under Youngblood.”).
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There are three main approaches to defining bad faith. The labels attached to
each approach are my own creation and are not used by any court. I believe,
however, that the labels effectively represent the approaches to defining bad faith as
revealed by different courts’ analyses of the problem.
A. Conclusive Presumption Approach
The conclusive presumption approach, while recognizing that bad faith is a
required element of Samek’s due process claim, would find that Samek has already
met his burden of proof to establish a due process violation. This is because “[t]he
presence or absence of bad faith by the police for purposes of the Due Process
Clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of
the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.”77 When the exculpatory value of
the evidence is clear, then subsequent loss or destruction of the evidence
conclusively indicates the presence of bad faith. The implication, applied to Samek,
is that Barce and DeLello realized that the Tape could help Samek and then “lost” it
to prevent Samek from benefitting from that help. In other words, Barce and
DeLello indicated by their conduct “that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant.”78 Once a conclusive presumption of bad faith arises, the
State has no opportunity to demonstrate the absence of bad faith and a defendant
need not prove anything further. Since Barce and DeLello were aware of the
exculpatory value of the Tape when they lost it, bad faith is conclusively presumed.
This approach to bad faith is simply an alternate formulation of Approach #2
discussed supra in Part II.B. Rather than concluding that Youngblood’s bad faith
requirement simply doesn’t apply when evidence has apparent exculpatory value,
courts adopting this approach conclusively presume that bad faith is present in any
situation where evidence with apparent exculpatory value is lost or destroyed. The
arguments made against Approach #2, supra in Part II.C., apply here as well.
This approach was rejected in United States v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc.79 The Court
“[did] not read [Youngblood’s] footnote as creating a rule that if evidence has
apparent exculpatory value at the time it is lost or destroyed, then an inference of bad
faith arises.”80 The Court argued that such a reading placed undue emphasis on the
footnote which was meant “to emphasize that the measure of the exculpatory value
of the evidence must be made with reference to the time it is destroyed, not, for
example, after other evidence is uncovered that may change the exculpatory nature

77

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*.

78

Id. at 58.

79

704 F. Supp. 1532 (E.D. Wis. 1989), modified by United States v. Lov-It Creamery, Inc.,
895 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1990).
80
Id. at 1548. Note: the word “inference” as used by the Court in Lov-It Creamery, Inc.,
has the same meaning as the term “conclusive presumption” that I use in my analysis. An
inference is “a truth or proposition drawn from another which is supposed or admitted to be
true. A process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition sought to be established is
deduced as a logical consequence from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved or
admitted. A logical and reasonable conclusion of a fact not presented by direct evidence but
which, by process of logic and reason, a trier of fact may conclude exists from the established
facts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (6th ed. 1990).
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of already-destroyed evidence.”81 The Lov-It Creamery Court rightly concluded that
while a government agent’s awareness of the exculpatory value of the evidence is
“certainly relevant to whether there was bad faith,” it cannot be the only measure.82
B. Rebuttable Presumption Approach
Because an inquiry into bad faith “must necessarily turn on the [government’s]
knowledge of the exculpatory value at the time it was lost or destroyed,”83 and
because the Tape Barce and DeLello lost was apparently exculpatory, this approach
to bad faith establishes a rebuttable presumption of bad faith in Samek’s favor.84
This presumption can be overturned upon the showing of sufficient proof by Barce
and DeLello that bad faith was not a factor behind the loss or destruction of the Tape.
United States v. Bohl85 demonstrates the rebuttable presumption approach. After
concluding that the lost evidence had potential exculpatory value,86 the Court
effectively established a rebuttable presumption of bad faith. They proceeded to
analyze the evidence for an “innocent explanation” of the destruction which could
rebut the presumption. They concluded that the evidence on record, “in the absence
of any innocent explanation offered by the government, [gave] rise to a logical
conclusion of bad faith.”87
In its discussion, the Court in Bohl analyzed prior caselaw to identify what sorts
of evidence might sufficiently rebut a presumption of bad faith. First, negligent loss
or destruction has been sufficient to rebut bad faith.88 In Youngblood, the failure of
81

Lov-It Creamery, 704 F. Supp. at 1548.

82

Id.

83

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*.

84
The rebuttable presumption approach, while placing heavy emphasis on Youngblood’s
footnote * avoids Lov-It Creamery’s criticism of the conclusive presumption approach’s
complete reliance on the footnote, see supra Part III.A., because it doesn’t use the footnote as
the “only” measure of bad faith.
85

25 F.3d 904 (10th Cir. 1994). The facts of United States v. Bohl are recounted supra
note 61.
86

It is necessary to remember that although the Bohl Court says that they are using the
term “potential exculpatory value” to refer to evidence of which “no more can be said than
that it could be subjected to tests the results of which might have exonerated the defendant,”
the destroyed evidence in Bohl does meet the standard of “apparent exculpatory value” that I
discussed supra at Part I. Both the Bohl Court and I believe that bad faith is a required element
given our determinations of exculpatory value. As a result, even though the Bohl court
mistakenly applies Trombetta and Youngblood in their analysis of the case, their use of the
rebuttable presumption approach appropriately demonstrates how the approach would operate
within the correct Trombetta/Youngblood framework discussed supra at Part II.
87

Id. at 913.

88

To demonstrate “negligent loss or destruction” that is sufficient to rebut bad faith, the
State must be able to demonstrate the method or manner in which the evidence was lost or
destroyed. For example, in United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993), the State
demonstrated that evidence was destroyed because “Agent Lively incorrectly failed to heed [a]
cross-referencing notation linking the Perea file [which contained evidence relating to Femia’s
case] to Femia’s file, which should have alerted him that the Tape recordings in Perea’s file
were to be preserved pending the disposition of Femia’s case.” Id. at 991-92. Such a showing
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police to preserve evidence was “at worst . . . described as negligent,”89 and no bad
faith was found. Subsequent cases have consistently affirmed negligence as
rebutting a finding of bad faith.90 Though unclear, it also appears as though gross
negligence is sufficient to rebut bad faith.91 Second, a showing that the evidence was
destroyed “pursuant to standard procedure” is the most common way that bad faith is
rebutted. “[C]ourts have held that the government does not necessarily engage in
bad faith conduct when the destruction of evidence results from a standard procedure
employed by the governmental department or agency regarding the disposal of the
evidence at least when there is adequate documentation of the destroyed evidence.”92
Following its examination, the Court concluded,

of negligence is sufficient to rebut the presumption of bad faith. It is not, however, enough
simply to say, “we don’t know what happened to the evidence and so it must have been
negligently lost.”
89

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

90
See, e.g., United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912 (10th Cir.1994); Holdren v. Legursky,
16 F.3d 57, 60 (4th Cir.1994) (police investigators’ negligence does not indicate bad faith);
Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that due process was not
violated when police’s loss of evidence was both “unprofessional” and “slip-shod” because
“mere negligence, without more, does not amount to a constitutional violation”); Collins v.
Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Ky. 1997) (“[M]ere negligence simply does not rise to
the level of bad faith required by Youngblood.”) (citation omitted). But see Youngblood, 488
U.S. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing a rule that allows negligence to rebut bad
faith Justice Blackmun asked, “Does ‘good faith police work’ require a certain minimum of
diligence, or will a lazy officer, who does not walk the few extra steps to the evidence
refrigerator, be considered to be acting in good faith?”).
91
See Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 n.120 (1993) (“The Court
has left open the possibility that ‘something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness
or ‘gross negligence’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.”)(citation
omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Femia, 9 F.3d 990, 992 (1st Cir. 1993) (gross negligence
in handing evidence did not constitute violation of due process); United States v. Jobson, 102
F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding no bad faith when the loss of evidence was attributable
to negligence, possibly even gross negligence); Perlmutter, supra note 71, at 529 (“By
establishing a bad faith test for lost evidence, the Court concluded that even gross negligence
on the part of the police should go unsanctioned.”). But see People v. Baca, 562 P.2d 411, 414
n.5 (Colo. 1977), (holding that under some circumstances gross negligence may be tantamount
to bad faith); People v. Newberry, 638 N.E.2d 1196, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[I]t would
appear to be a reasonable assumption that conduct amounting to ‘gross negligence,’ . . . be
deemed to be tantamount to bad faith on the part of the State.”).
92

United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 912-13 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
Gibson, 963 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1992) (United States Border Patrol agents “routinely”
destroy seized controlled substances sixty days after informing the United States Attorney
about the seizure, pursuant to agency procedure)); United States v. Belden, 957 F.2d 671, 67374 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that cutting of marijuana plants pursuant to routine practice due to
lack of storage capacity does not rise to the level of bad faith), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 882
(1992)). But see Gordon, supra note 71, at 223 (expressing fear that this rule gives the police
free reign “to establish arbitrary guidelines requiring all evidence, including that which might
be useful to the defense, to be destroyed routinely in order to preclude its disclosure”).
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What this authority teaches is that even if the government destroys or
facilitates the disposition of evidence knowing of its potentially
exculpatory value, there might exist innocent explanations for the
government’s conduct that are reasonable under the circumstances to
negate any [presumption] of bad faith. Although the defendant has the
burden of proving the bad faith of the government in destroying the
evidence . . . we note that the government here offers no reasonable
rational or good faith explanation for the destruction of the evidence.93
Based on the Bohl analysis and the facts originally provided in Samek, Barce and
DeLello will be unable to rebut a presumption of bad faith. Because they do not
know how they lost the Tape (they do not even know who lost the Tape), they cannot
claim that the loss was the result of “mere negligence.”94 Moreover, they have no
argument that the Tape was destroyed according to standard police procedure. This
is especially true given that Barce and DeLello did not work through normal
channels by placing the Tape into evidence.
Aside from the two categories defined in Bohl, it is unclear what else might
sufficiently rebut bad faith. One possibility is that a state actor’s declaration that he
did not act intentionally, or in bad faith, might rebut a presumption of bad faith.
Though this possibility has not been explicitly addressed by any court, courts do
seem to take into account whether or not a state actor does make such a declaration
when performing their bad faith analysis. The Samek Court placed great weight on a
government agent’s testimony that “the [evidence] was simply misplaced, not
purposefully destroyed” and then used this statement to effectually equate the loss
with negligence.95 Allowing this sort of testimony to rebut bad faith would move the
rebuttable presumption approach closer toward the no presumption approach
discussed infra Part III.C.96
In the event that State actors are able to rebut a presumption of bad faith, the
burden shifts back to the defendant who must make an affirmative showing of bad
faith to prove a due process violation.97
C. No Presumption Approach
The no presumption approach requires Samek to affirmatively prove that Barce
and DeLello acted with “official animus” or a “conscious effort to suppress

93

Bohl, 25 F.3d at 913.

94
As discussed infra at note 93, the Samek Court did ultimately conclude that the loss was
the result of negligence. This was not because the method of loss revealed negligence.
Instead, the conclusion was based on DeLello’s testimony that he “misplaced” the tape and did
not “destroy” it. See Samek v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
95

Id.

96
Commentators have expressed concern about the possibility that a State actor’s
statement could be enough to rebut bad faith, “[a]nother danger . . . is the likelihood that the
court will without question accept an agent’s statement that he destroyed the evidence in good
faith.” Kaufmann, supra note 71, at 687-88.
97

Presumably, this independent showing of bad faith would resemble the sort of bad faith
showing required by the no presumption approach discussed infra in Part III.C.
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exculpatory evidence” when they lost the Tape.98 If they did not intend to deprive
Samek of exculpatory evidence or otherwise harm him, bad faith is not established
and there is no due process violation.
This approach to bad faith was first articulated by United States v.
Zambrana99 prior to the Court’s explicit articulation of the bad faith requirement in
Youngblood. It is based upon a factor considered by the Court in Trombetta.
Holding that there was no due process violation, the Court noted, “[t]he record
contains no allegation of official animus towards [defendants] or of a conscious
effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”100 Courts like Zambrana cite Trombetta as
though this finding was essential to its holding101 and created an absolute
requirement of these things in order to find bad faith. This representation is
inaccurate. The absence of these motives was simply one factor which the Court
examined to determine that bad faith was not present. Clearly, bad faith is present
when State agents lose or destroy evidence with “official animus” or “conscious
effort to suppress,” but bad faith is not necessarily absent when State agents lose or
destroy evidence and independent proof of these specific motives is lacking.
The no presumption approach is troubling for several other reasons. First, it has
not be re-evaluated in light of Youngblood.102 Given that Youngblood is the seminal
case on the issue of bad faith, it seems odd that there is no discussion of how the
reasoning in Youngblood might impact the reasoning of the no presumption
approach. An obvious point for discussion might be that Youngblood doesn’t cite or
articulate the Trombetta factor that the no presumption approach is based upon. It
seems that the Youngblood Court would have highlighted it had their intention been
to create an absolute rule from that factor. Moreover, Justice Blackmun, who sat on
the panel that decided Youngblood, wasn’t himself clear that bad faith required such
intentional conduct.
He asked, “Does a defendant have to show actual
malice. . . ?”103
The Youngblood decision is not entirely void of support for the no presumption
approach. The Court does make a single reference to acts of “intention” citing
United States v. Marion104 in its discussion of “the importance for constitutional
purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government when the claim is based

98
See United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 218 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Trombetta, 467
U.S. at 488).
99
841 F.2d 1320, 1341-42 (7th Cir. March 7, 1988) (“[T]he loss or destruction of evidence
does not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absent ‘official
animus’ or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.’“).
100

Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488.

101

Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1341-42 (holding that “the loss or destruction of evidence does
not implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment absent ‘official animus’
or a ‘conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence’“).
102

Zambrana, 841 F.2d at 1320, outlined the no presumption bad faith formulation in
March of 1988 while Youngblood was not decided until November 29, 1988.
103

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

104

404 U.S. 307 (1971).
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on loss of evidence attributable to the Government.”105 This sole reference to
intention, however, seems insufficient to support a definition of “bad faith” that
requires an intentional act done with “official animus” or “conscious effort.” This is
especially true given that Marion is cited to support a general bad faith standard but
is not applied in the Court’s analysis of the Youngblood case. In contrast to Marion,
Youngblood discusses bad faith without using volitional words like “intent” and
“purpose.” The Court said that bad faith occurs where “the police themselves by
very conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating
defendant.”106 This statement opens up the possibility that in some instances
conduct, rather than the sort of mindset or intent required by the no presumption
approach, can indicate bad faith. For example, the Arizona Court of Appeals cited
Trombetta and Youngblood to support the proposition that “in the context of a due
process analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear that ‘bad faith’ has less to do
with the actor’s intent than with the actor’s knowledge that the evidence was
‘constitutionally material.’”107
Samek offers no direct evidence that Barce or DeLello were motivated by
“official animus” or “conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.”108 There is
some circumstantial evidence that might support such a motivation. Samek could
argue that Barce’s instruction to DeLello not to place the Tape into evidence
demonstrates bad faith, but it seems unlikely that this conduct, in the absence of
additional motive proving evidence, would be sufficient to demonstrate the required
mindset. This was the finding of the Indiana Court of Appeals. They indicated that
circumstantial evidence in the form of Barce’s instruction not to place the Tape into
evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of bad faith because it was not
conclusive of Barce’s mindset. The Court suggested that absent direct evidence of
bad faith, the only sort of circumstantial evidence that might rise to the level of bad
faith would have been an affirmative instruction to destroy the Tape. The Court
concluded, “[t]he record reveals that though Barce told DeLello not to place the Tape
in evidence, he did not tell DeLello to destroy the tape. DeLello testified that the
tape was simply misplaced, not purposefully destroyed. This evidence does not
prove ‘conscious doing of wrong’ . . . .”109 Theoretically, Samek has the opportunity
to discover this additional motive proving evidence (if it exists). Practically,
however, even if the evidence exists, the opportunity is non-existent. “The defendant
is ill-suited to inquire into subjective good faith or bad faith of the police. The most
relevant evidence of police good or bad faith is apt to lie within the control of the
police, and police officers are highly unlikely to cooperate voluntarily with
defendants by accusing fellow officers of misconduct.”110 “As Justice Blackmun
suggested in dissent, the ‘inherent difficulty a defendant would have in obtaining

105

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.

106

Id. at 58.

107

State v. Walker, 914 P.2d 1320, 1330 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996).

108

Direct evidence might include things such as an admission by either Barce or DeLello
that one or both of these motives were present.
109

Samek, 688 N.E.2d at 1289.

110

The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, 103 HARV. L. REV. 40, 166 (1989).
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evidence to show a lack of good faith’ makes [such a] test unworkable and
unprincipled.”111
D. Bad Faith is Best Defined by the Rebuttable Presumption Approach
The rebuttable presumption approach represents the best way to define bad faith.
The approach is consistent with Youngblood because it acknowledges footnote *,
that bad faith “must necessarily turn on the [government’s] knowledge of the
exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed”112 without
placing undue emphasis on it.113 The approach provides a workable definition of bad
faith for both defendants and government agents. Unlike the no presumption
approach, the rebuttable presumption approach does not place an impossible burden
on a defendant by requiring him to prove the subjective mindset of government
agents.114
The rebuttable presumption approach does what the conclusive
presumption does not. It allows the government an opportunity to demonstrate that
bad faith was not a part of the loss or destruction of evidence.115 This opportunity is
consistent with Youngblood’s goal of limiting the extent of the government’s
obligation to preserve evidence.116 At the same time, the rebuttable presumption
approach fulfills Youngblood’s goal of protecting a defendant when a government
agent’s conduct affirmatively demonstrates that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant but evidence conclusive of that agent’s subjective mindset
is unavailable.117
IX. CONCLUSION
The Indiana Court of Appeals made three common mistakes when it applied
Trombetta and Youngblood in Samek v. State.118 The first mistake they made was to
conclude that lost evidence does not have “apparent exculpatory value” unless it is
certain to cast doubt on the guilt of the defendant. This mistake led the Court to
conclude that the Tape lost by Barce and DeLello did not have apparent exculpatory
value because it did not “prove that Jacobsen committed the burglary instead of
Samek.”119 This mistake could have been avoided if the Court had properly focused
111

Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 66-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

112

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56 n.*.

113

See analysis of conclusive presumption approach supra Part III.A.

114

See supra Part III.C.

115

See supra Part III.A & B.

116

See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. “We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith
on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police’s obligation to preserve evidence
to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most
clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that
the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”).
117

Id.

118

688 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).

119

Id. at 1289. (“We hold this tape to be potentially useful evidence, not material
exculpatory evidence. Without the identification of the speaker and evidence as to the
circumstances surrounding the making of the tape, the tape does not prove that Jacobsen
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on whether the exculpatory value of the lost evidence was apparent prior to its loss
rather than on the degree of certainty with which the evidence would exculpate the
defendant. So long as its exculpatory value is apparent to government agents, any
evidence that tends to cast doubt on the guilt of the defendant has apparent
exculpatory value.
One reason that courts continually botch their analysis of “apparent exculpatory
value” is that they use the label “potentially exculpatory” in different ways. Some
use the label to refer to the sort of evidence lost in Youngblood of which “no more
can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might
have exonerated the defendant.”120 This sort of evidence does not meet the “apparent
exculpatory value” standard because the people who lose this evidence are not aware
of any exculpatory value before they lose it. By contrast, a number of courts (i.e. the
9th Circuit in Cooper) use the label “potentially exculpatory” to refer evidence that
has exculpatory value, but whose exculpatory potential is less than certain (i.e. the
evidence may cast doubt on guilt but is not certain to prove innocence). So long as
the exculpatory value of this sort of evidence is apparent before the evidence is lost
or destroyed, the materiality standard of “apparent exculpatory value” is met.
The Indiana Court of Appeals made a second common mistake by requiring
proof of bad faith only when the lost or destroyed evidence does not have apparent
exculpatory value. The Court required Samek to prove bad faith because of their
conclusion that the Tape did not have apparent exculpatory value.121 Had they
realized that the Tape did have apparent exculpatory value, they presumably would
have found a due process violation without requiring bad faith. This result would not
have been proper or consistent with Youngblood. This second mistake could have
been avoided if the Court had recognized that Youngblood’s bad faith requirement
applies to all failure to preserve evidence cases.
The Indiana Court of Appeals made its third and final mistake because it did not
know the substance of Youngblood’s bad faith requirement. Believing that the
requirement could only be met by an independent demonstration that government
agents consciously intended to suppress exculpatory evidence or acted with official
animus toward the defendant the Court determined that Samek failed to prove bad
faith because he could not show that Barce and DeLello purposefully destroyed the
Tape.122 This mistaken conclusion could have been avoided if the Court had applied

committed the burglary instead of Samek . . . The tape would be potentially useful because
with proper identification, verification, and supporting evidence the tape might have helped to
exonerate Samek.”)
120

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.

121

Id. (“[W]hen the evidence at issue falls within the definition of material exculpatory
evidence, the defendant need not establish bad faith in order to prove a due process violation.
Bad faith is relevant only when the evidence merely meets the definition of potentially useful
evidence.”).
122
Samek, 688 N.E.2d 1286. (“The record reveals that though Barce told DeLello not to
place the Tape in evidence, he did not tell DeLello to destroy the Tape. DeLello testified that
the Tape was simply misplaced, not purposefully destroyed. This evidence does not prove
‘conscious doing of wrong,’ . . . . We, therefore, hold that Samek has failed to show that the
State’s failure to preserve the Tape was done in bad faith.”).
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the rebuttable presumption approach to bad faith.123
Whenever apparently
exculpatory evidence is lost or destroyed the rebuttable presumption approach shifts
the burden of showing an innocent explanation for the loss or destruction to the
government. Bad faith is commonly rebutted where the evidence is lost or destroyed
as a result of mere negligence or where the evidence was destroyed pursuant to
standard procedure.
To avoid making any of the three mistakes made by the Indiana Court of Appeals
and countless other courts like them, a court applying Trombetta and
Youngblood must know three things. First, they must understand what it means for
evidence to have “apparent exculpatory value.” Specifically, they must focus their
attention on whether any exculpatory value is apparent while at the same time
recognizing that evidence with such value need not go so far as to conclusively
“prove” a defendant’s innocence. Second, they must apply Youngblood’s bad faith
requirement to all cases where the government has failed to preserve evidence.
Finally, a court should apply the rebuttable presumption approach as the most
effective method of determining whether bad faith is present.

123

The rebuttable presumption approach is discussed supra at Part III.B & D.
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